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OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.
EDMUND JONES, '95 L.
Edmund Jones, the former Librarian and Bursar of the Law
Department of the University of Pennsylvania, died in Denver,
Col., on August 18, 19o4.
Mr. Jones was born in Philadelphia, March 9, 1874. His
parents were descendants of the oldest and best-known families
in Salem and Atlantic Counties, N. J., and several of his an-
cestors were judges of county courts in South Jersey.
Mr. Jones was educated in the public schools of Philadelphia,
and was one of the public school commencement orators in
z889. He then read law with Hon. Lewis C. Cassidy, one of
the last of the old school of great lawyers in Philadelphia.
After Mr. Cassidy's death he studied with his partner, Pierce
Archer.
714 NOTES.
Having been awarded a scholarship on competitive examina-
tion, Mr. Jones entered the Law Department of the University
in the fall of 1892, graduating in June, 1895, with the degree of
LL.D. He was elected Librarian of the Department for three
years, succeeding Mr. S. Stanger Iszard. He then associated
with Christopher Fallom, a member of the Bar. His advance-
ment at the Bar was rapid, having had considerable practice in
the Common Pleas, Orphans', and Criminal Courts, as also the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania and the District Court of the
United States. Failing health, however, obliged him to re-
linquish his practice and move to Colorado.
Mr. Jones was an elocutionist of some note. He was a
graduate of the International School of Oratory and Elocu-
tion, and a private pupil of Professor George B. Hynson, who
was at one time instructor in public speaking at the University.
During most of his spare time -in the evening he filled en-
gagements at concerts and entertainments. -His services were
much sought after, and were always freely given when the
entertainment was for the benefit of a charity.
He was a member of the Grace M. E. Church of Philadel-
phia, where he took an active part in the work of the church, as
well as the Sunday-school. He also took an active part in the
affairs of the Young Men's Christian Association, of which he
was a member for many years.
For several years Mir. Jones was the Treasurer of the Alumni
Society of the Law Department of the University of Pennsyl-
vania, as also the International School of Oratory.
On June I9, 19o, Mr. Jones was marriedto Emma Bonnin,
of Germantown, whom he leaves surviving with one- child.
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR INJURIES TO THIRD PARTIES
CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IN
RESPECT OF PREMISES UPON WHICH THE PUBLIC ARE IN-
VITED UPON PAYMENT OF A FEE. Texas State Fair v.
Brittain, ix8 Fed. Rep. 713 (Igo2).-The general law
that there is no liability upon the employer for the negli-
gence of an independent contractor is well settled. The
general principle may "be stated thus: When an individual or
corporation contracts with another individual or corporation
exercising an independent employment for the latter to perform
a work, not a nuisance per se, or in itself unlawful, or likely to
cause harm to others, such work to be done according to the
contractor's own methods, and not "subject to the employer's
control as to the manner in which it is to be done, but only as
to the results to be obtained, the employer is not liable to a
NOTES.
third person for injury to such third person caused by the neg-
ligence of an independent contractor. See note to Covington,
etc., Bridgc Co. v. Steinbrock, 76 Am. St. Rep. 382, 385 (1899).
Moreover, it may be said that whenever circumstances impose
a dztty upon the employer he cannot escape liability by employ-
ing an independent contractor. Thus in Texas State Fair v.
Brittain, i18 Fed. Rep. 713 (1902), and Texas State Fair v.
Marti, 69 S. W. Rep. 432 (i9o2),-both cases being founded
upon the same cause of action,-the State Fair Association
under a contract with Smith and Lucas, in return for a portion
of the receipts, gave them the exclusive use of a part of the fair
grounds for exhibition purposes,. and advertised this exhibi-
tion as one of the attractions of the fair. The seating capacity
provided by the State Fair proving inadequate, Smith and
Lucas erected other seats. Owing to some negligence in
their construction these last-mentioned seats fell, injuring
Brittain, the defendant in error. The State Fair sought to
avoid liability on the ground that Brittain's injuries, if
caused by the negligence of anyone, were caused by the
negligence of Smith and Lucas, who were independent
contractors, and not its agents, and for whose acts it was
in no way responsible. But the court held that no matter
by whom the seats were erected, it was the duty of the State.
Fair to see that the same were in a reasonably safe condition
before inviting the public to occupy them: "Under the circum-
stances," said the court, "it was the duty of the plaintiff (inerror) to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to those
"attending the entertainment. This is certainly true regarding
the safety of the premises." 69 S. W. Rep. 433. To the same
effect is the case of Richmond, etc., RI,. Co. v. Moore, 94 Va.
493 (1897). The rule laid down by Cooley is made the basis
of the decision: ". . . . when one expressly or by implication
invites others to come upon his premises, whether for business
or any other purpose, it is his duty to be reasonably sure he is
not inviting them into danger, and to that end he must exercise
ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably
safe for the visit." (Cooley on "Torts," 2d Ed., p. 718.) Thus
it will be observed that it is negligence-the failure to perform
a duty-that renders the State Fair liable. And, indeed, in all
cases of this kind, if the injury be caused by the independent
contractor's negligence, the responsibility for this negligence
falls upon the employer, who is himself negligent, either for.
permitting an act to fie done which may result in injury unless
proper precautions are taken and failing to take such precau-
tions, or for accepting work done in a defective manner with-
out ascertaining whether it is reasonably fit for the purpose for
which it is to be used.
NOTES.
In Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. (5 Q. B.) 5oi (i87o); where
defendant sold to plaintiff a seat on a grand stand for the pur-
pose of viewing a steeple-chase, and owing to the negligent
construction of the stand it collapsed.and, injured plaintiff, it.
was said that there was an implied contract on the part of the
defendant that the stand was reasonably fit for the purpose for
which it was to be used. The court said: "One who lets for
hire, or engages for the supply of any article, or thing, whether
it be a carriage to be ridden in, or a bridge to be passed over
-(Grote v. Chester and Holyhead Ry. Co., 2 Exch. 251, 1848),
or a stand from which to view a steeple-chase, or a place to be
sat in by anybody who is to witness a spectacle for a pecuniary
consideration, does warrant, and does impliedly contract, that
the article or thing is reasonably fit for the purpose to which it
is to be applied, subject, however, to this important qualifica-
tion: he does not contract against any unseen or unknown
defect which cannot be discovered, or which may be said to be
undiscoverable by any ordinary or reasonable means of inquiry
or examination (Redhead v. Midland Ry. Co., 2o L. T. Rep.
(N. S.) 628, 1867), per Kelly, C. B. Yet even in this case the
idea that there was a duty incumbent upon the employer was
present, for Martin; B., points out that there existed between
the plaintiff and the defendant " one of those implied contracts
which, in point of fact, is the same as a duty." The duty was
personal on the defendant when he received the admission fee
to provide that the stand was ordinarily fit and proper for the
purpose for which it was to be used. So also in Pike v. 7he
Polytechnic Institution, i F. and F. 712 (1859).
In general it may be said that persons managing an exhibi-
tion are under just the same obligation with respect to making
their premises safe as are other owners of real property. The
proprietor of a hall to which the public are invited is bound to
use ordinary care and diligence to put and keep the hall in a
reasonably safe condition for persons attending in pursuance of
such invitation, and if he neglects his duty in this respect so
that the hall is unsafe, his knowledge or ignorance of "the
defect is immaterial: Currier v. Boston Music Hall, 135 Mass.
413 (1883). If an owner or occupier of land directly or'im-
pliedly induces persons to come upon his premises, he thereby
assumes an obligation that the premises are in a reasonably safe
condition, so that persons there by his invitation shall not be
injured by them or in their use for the purpose for which the
invitation was extended: Hart v. Washington Park Club, 157
Ill. 9 (1895). "A person erecting and maintaining a hall for
exhibition purposes must use reasonable care in the construc-
tion, maintenance, and management of it, having regard to the
character of the exhibitions to be given and the customary con-
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duct of the spectators who witness them :" Schofield v. Wood,
170 Mass. 415 (1898). But on the lease of a building for ex-
hibition purposes, the gallery being designed only for a limited
number of spectators, there is no implied warranty that they
shall be safe fiom a turbulent crowd. It is safe only for ordi-
nary uses. " If any responsibility attaches to the defendant,"
said the court, " it cannot be based upon any contract obliga-
tion, but must rest entirely upon its dclictum?' Edwards v.
N. Y. and Harlems Ry. Co., 98 N. Y. 245, 248 (x885).
The doctrine that when one invites another upon his premises
he impliedly warrants that they are reasonably safe was fol-
lowed in Fox v. Buffalo Park, 21 N. Y. App. Div. 321 (1897),
where it was said: "While it is undoubtedly true in ordinary
cases in the leasing of buildings that there is no implied war-
ranty on the part of the lessor that the buildings are fit and
safe for the purposes for which they are leased, the rule is dif-
ferent in regard to buildings and structures in which public
entertainments and exhibitions are designed to be given and for
admissions to which the lessors directly or indirectly receive
compensation. In such cases the lessors or owners of the build-
ings or structures hold out to the public that the structures are
reasonably safe for the purposes for which they are let or used,
and impliedly undertake that due care has been exercised in the
erection of the buildings :" Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. (5 Q. B.)
5o1 (187o) ; Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28 (1874); Camp v.
Wood, 76 N. Y. 92 (1879); Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283
(1877); Grote v. C. and H. R. Co., 2 Exch. 251 (x848);
Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552 (1871); Wendell
v. Baxter, 12 Gray, 494 (1859).
Having stated the duties of the employer with respect to the
condition of his premises, we have now to inquire when he has
been held liable for injuries to a person caused by the negligence-
of an independent contractor who is conducting an exhibition on
the employer's grounds. One who employs an independent
contractor to make and conduct an exhibition is not relieved
from responsibility to persons receiving injury if the exhibition
is of a kind which will probably cause injury unless due pre-
cautions are taken to guard against harm: Thompson v.
Lowell, etc:, Street Rv. Co., 170 Mass. 577 (1898); Curtis v.
Kiley, 153 Mass. 123 (i89i); Richmond, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Moore, 94 Va. 493 (I897) ; Hanver v. Whalen, 49 Ohio St.
209 (1892); Bower v. Peate, i Q. B. D. 32. In Richmond,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Moore (supra) it is said: "It is immaterial
whether. the person giving the exhibition is an independent con-
tractor or not. The gist of the action is the negligent failure
of the defendant to use proper care to protect a visitor from a
danger on its premises while there at the defendant's invita-
tion." So, also, in Conradt v. Clauve, 93 Ind. 476 (1883), and
Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein, 64 N.J. L. 624 ( 9OO).
But in Smith v. Benick, 87 Md. 610 (1898), a different view is
taken. It is there said that " when an owner or occupier of
premises employs a competent person to do work which of itself
is not a nuisance, or of -which the necessary or probable conse-
quence would not be to injure others, the employer is not rez
sponsible for such negligence as is entirely collateral to, and not
a probable consequence of, the work contracted for," citing
Dcford v. State, 31 Md. 179; Suburban Co. v. Moores, 8o Md.
348; Randleson v. Murray, 8 Adol. and Ell. iog; Davis v.
Congregational Society, 129 Mass. 367; Pickard v. Smith, Io
C. B. (N. S.) 468. And in Deyo v. Kingston Consolidated Ry.
Co., 88 N. Y. Supp. 487 (i9o4), where the defendant invited
the public to its park to witness an exhibition given by an
independent contractor, and the plaintiff was injured by the
negligent discharge of a rocket by one of the contractor's ser-.
vants, it was held that the defendant was not liable, as he could
not reasonably have been expected to foresee the independent
contractor's negligence.
In conclusion, it may be said that apparently in all cases in
which the employer has been held liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor in respect of premises upon which the
public are invited, there has been a duty cast upon the defen-
dant by reason of the invitation to see that the premises are
reasonably safe for the purposes for which the invitation has
been extended.
F.H.S.
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